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Abstract
We show that the signature scheme proposed by Shao [1] is subject to homomor-
phism attacks, despite a claim in [1] to the contrary.
1 Introduction
ElGamal [2] and DSS [3] signature schemes are subject to homomorphism attacks. El-
Gamal signatures work as follows. Let p be a large prime such that p   1 has a large
prime factor, and let g be a primitive element modulo p. Suppose user A has private key
x (1 < x < p  1) and public key y = g
x
mod p. To sign message m, A randomly chooses
1
an integer k, 1 < k < p   1, computes r = g
k
mod p, s = (m   xr)k
 1
mod (p  1) and
(r; s) is the signature.
He and Kiesler [4] describe the following `homomorphism attack'. Suppose that, for
three distinct signatures, the respective random values k satisfy k
3
= k
1
+k
2
. An observer
can deduce this by noting that r
3
= r
1
r
2
. This immediately yields the private key from
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2
)
 1
:
Shao [1] describes an ElGamal variant claimed to be immune to this attack. However,
we show that this is not the case.
2 Shao's Scheme
We rst describe Shao's scheme. The globally known system parameters are a large prime
modulus p, a prime divisor q of p  1, and an integer g of order q. User A has two secret
keys x
1
; x
2
(1 < x
i
< p), and two public keys:
y
1
= g
x
1
mod p; y
2
= g
x
2
mod p:
To sign message m, A randomly chooses two integers k
1
and k
2
, 1 < k
1
; k
2
< q,
computes r

= g
k
1
+ mg
k
2
mod p, r = r

mod q, s
1
= (k
1
  r   m)x
 1
1
mod q, s
2
=
(k
2
  r  m)x
 1
2
mod q, and (r; s
1
; s
2
) is the signature.
3 The Attack
An observer can compute g
k
1
mod p and g
k
2
mod p from message m and its signature
(r; s
1
; s
2
), since
g
k
i
 g
x
i
s
i
+r+m
 y
s
i
i
g
r+m
(mod p); i = 1; 2:
2
Suppose three pairs of random values: (k
1
; k
2
), (k
0
1
; k
0
2
), (k
00
1
; k
00
2
) were used to generate
the signatures (r; s
1
; s
2
), (r
0
; s
0
1
; s
0
2
), (r
00
; s
00
1
; s
00
2
) on messages m, m
0
, m
00
respectively. If
k
1
= k
0
1
+ k
00
1
, then this relation can be recognised by an observer, since
g
k
1
 g
k
0
1
g
k
00
1
(mod p):
This gives three linear equations in x
1
, k
1
, k
0
1
, k
00
1
:
x
1
s
0
1
 k
0
1
  r
0
 m
0
(mod q);
x
1
s
00
1
 k
00
1
  r
00
 m
00
(mod q);
and
x
1
s
1
 k
1
  r m (mod q):
From these equations, and since k
1
= k
0
1
+ k
00
1
, one can easily obtain the rst half of the
private key from:
x
1
= f(r
0
+ r
00
  r) + (m
0
+m
00
 m)g  (s
1
  s
0
1
  s
00
1
)
 1
mod p:
Similarly, if k
2
= k
0
2
+ k
00
2
, the second part of the private key is given by:
x
2
= f(r
0
+ r
00
  r) + (m
0
+m
00
 m)g  (s
2
  s
0
2
  s
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2
)
 1
mod p:
4 Conclusion
Contrary to Shao's claim, we have shown that Shao's scheme is vulnerable to homomor-
phism attacks. The main justication in [1] for the use of Shao's scheme is its resistance to
homomorphism and substitution attacks. Substitution attacks can be avoided by the use
of a one-way hash-function, and so there appears to be no reason to use Shao's scheme.
3
Although the ElGamal scheme and its variants (e.g. DSS) are subject to homomor-
phism attacks, such an attack being successful appears to be no more likely than nding
a discrete logarithm, as long as the random integer used to construct the signature is
chosen at random.
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